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FEDERAL FUNDING FOR THE PRESERVATION OF R ELIGIOUS HISTORIC PLACES :
OLD NORTH CHURCH AND THE N EW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Christen Sproule
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . .”
-- The First Amendment of the United States Constitution1
“What would many neighborhoods be like if there were only rubble-strewn empty lots
or another batch of fluorescent-lighted fried chicken outlets where these weathered
Romanesque and Gothic Revival structures now stand?”
-- Peter Steinfels, The New York Times, November 1, 1997 2
INTRODUCTION
On May 27, 2003, the National Parks Service of the Department of the Interior announced a
$317,000 grant under the “Save America’s Treasure’s” program for the historic preservation of
Boston’s Old North Church. 3 The church is the famous site in whose steeple lanterns were hung to
signal to Paul Revere in 1775 that the British were coming. 4 Regular worship services are still
conducted every Sunday in the 280 year old structure. 5
This grant marks a major shift in the views of the federal government about the
constitutionality of the federal government’s role in providing funding for the restoration of historic
buildings currently being used for religious purposes. 6 Until this shift in policy, the federal
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U.S. CONST . amend. I.
Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1997, at B7.
3
News Release, National Park Service, Old North Foundation Awarded $317,000 Grant Under Save America’s Treasures
Program, (May 27, 2003), available at http://www.nps.gov/pub_aff/pressrm.htm.
4
The Old North Church Guidebook , at http://www.oldnorth.com/guid.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
5
Id.
6
Compare Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Preservation Grants to Religious Properties, Memorandumfrom Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S.
Department of the Interior (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm, available at
www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm with Authority of the Department of the Interior to Provide Historic Preservation Grants to
Historic Religious Properties such as the Old North Church, Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Department of the
Interior (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/OldNorthChurch.htm. Note a similar shift in policy
regarding FEMA under the Faith Based Initiative. This program is now authorized to provide grants to religious
institutions in other policy contexts. See Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy,
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, For the General Counsel, Federal
Emergency Management Agency (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/FEMAAssistance.htm.
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government concluded that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution forbid the use of federal funds
for the restoration of historically significant religious buildings that were also used for religious
purposes, such as worship or religious instruction. 7 Specifically, the Park Service removed the
provision in its application for a grant from this program that previously excluded “[h]istoric properties
and collections associated with an active religious organization (for example, restoration of an historic
church that is still actively used as a church).”8 This new policy, in contrast, makes such religious
buildings eligible to receive funding from the federal Save America’s Treasures program. 9
On May 28, 2003, the Office of Legal Counsel released an opinion concerning historic
preservation grants to religious places. 10 It was upon the authority of this Office of Legal Counsel
opinion that the National Park Service made the grant to restore the Old North Church. 11 The opinion
reversed the longstanding federal view that governing Supreme Court precedent prohibits such grants
as embodied in the previously controlling opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel dated October 31,
1995.12 Because there is no Supreme Court precedent directly on point, all analysis is based upon
analogy to cases in the education and other fields, and conjecture about the future direction of the
Establishment Clause doctrine. The opinion concludes that the Constitution permits grants to houses
of worship when they are among many beneficiaries, not defined by reference to religion, in a program
with broad, secular goals. 13 Secretary of the Interior Gale A. Norton explained the new policy of the
administration as such: “This new policy will bring balance to our historic preservation program and
end a discriminatory double-standard that has been applied against religious properties. All nationally
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See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 6.
Save America’s Treasures: FY 2002 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual and
Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions at 1, available at
http://www.pcah.gov/sat/SAT2002.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
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2003 Memorandum; see News Release, supra note 3.
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Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, supra note 6.
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News Release, supra note 3 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Gale A. Norton).
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Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, supra note 8, at 17.
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significant historic structures - including those used for religious purposes - will now be eligible to
receive funding from Save America’s Treasures program.”14
This change in policy strikes at the heart of the sharp debate on the Supreme Court about the
correct meaning of the Establishment Clause between two competing interpretations, separationism
and neutralism. 15 Separationism, sometimes described as the creation of a “wall of separation”
between church and state, has been the dominant theme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for fifty
years. 16 According to strict separationist theory, the government may not support, assist, or otherwise
promote religion or religious institutions. Over the past twenty years, however, Supreme Court
jurisprudence has shifted towards the neutralism theory. 17 Neutralism is premised on the idea that
because the government may not confer a disfavored status upon religion, government may provide aid
to religion and religious institutions if done in a neutral and non-discriminatory manner.
The Save America’s Treasures program helps to preserve links with our past that help us
understand who we are as a nation. Historic religious buildings are among those places that represent
our country’s cultural heritage. This Note argues that if such a grant to preserve the Old North Church,
or another religious building, is challenged, the Supreme Court would uphold these grants as valid
under the recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mitchell v.
Helms. 18 The regulations controlling the use of grant funds by religious institutions prohibit those
funds from being to promote religion, and may only be used to preserve historically significant
features. As such, the grant program has a secular purpose, and does not have the effect of advancing
religion. In addition, the grant program may be sustained under the principle that religious institutions
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News Release, supra note 3 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Gale A. Norton).
This structure is borrowed from Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants
to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 123-143.
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See infra text accompanying notes 145-162.
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530 U.S. 793 (2000) (O’Connor, J. concurring in judgment).
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may not be discriminated against in the distribution of general governmental services provided on the
basis of neutral criteria. 19
Part I of this Note considers the state of historic religious properties, the contributions they
make to their community, and the threats they face. Part II considers the federal laws that apply to
historic preservation, detailing the National Historic Preservation Act and the Save America’s
Treasures grants program. In Part III, the Note next considers Establishment Clause jurisprudence, its
current shift toward neutralism, and its applicability to grants to religious buildings. The two opinions
of the Office of Legal Counsel about the constitutionality of providing historic preservation grants to
religious buildings are considered in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, this Note attempts to ground in
Supreme Court jurisprudence the arguments made by the most recent Office of Legal Counsel opinion.
The Note determines that the Save America’s Treasures program may constitutionally provide grants
to religious institutions, and also provides suggestions to ensure such grants remain within the limits of
the Establishment Clause.
I. HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND
AMERICA’S ENDANGERED HISTORIC HOUSES OF WORSHIP
In May of 2003, the National Trust for Historic Places placed America’s Historic Urban
Houses of Worship at the top of its list of “America’s 11 Most Endangered Historic Places,”20 a yearly
list of important historical and cultural sites that are threatened by demolition, slow and steady
deterioration, and neglect. 21 The Trust cautioned that these houses of worship are endangered by
declining membership, increasing maintenance costs, and in some instances “soaring real estate values
that make selling the property an attractive proposition for shrinking congregations.”22 Moreover, if
these buildings are allowed to deteriorate or be demolished, not only is their architectural and historical
19

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Eleven Most Endangered Historic Places 2003, at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11most/2003/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
21
See generally National Trust for Historic Preservation, 2004 Nomination Form – The Guidelines, (2004) available at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/11Most_2004_nomguidelines.pdf.
22
National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, (2003) available at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/2003/Endangered_Urban_Worship.pdf.
20
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value lost, but also their ability to continue to provide critical community services to people in the
nation’s most impoverished neighborhoods. 23
1. Historic Value of Houses of Worship
“We can’t tell American history without talking about the history of our sacred places . . . We
can’t have a strong future for our community without safeguarding the buildings (that are used for
worship),” Senator Joseph Lieberman told an event organized by the Partners for Sacred Places, a nonsectarian, non-profit organization dedicated to the care and active use of America’s older and historic
sacred places. 24 Indeed, much of American history has evolved in an around our houses of worship,
providing “eloquent testimony” to the American experience and the quest for religious freedom that
helped shape our nation. 25 The National Trust suggests that “[c]hurches, synagogues, temples and
mosques are often the most ambitious, beloved, and architecturally significant buildings in any given
urban neighborhood. Their domes, towers, and spires provide identifying elements in the local skyline,
and they attest to the diverse traditions that have created cities and towns across the country.”26
There are many examples of houses of worship that contribute to our nation’s historical and
cultural legacy. Old North Church, for examp le, has held its place in American history from when
Robert Newman climbed the steeple and briefly hung the two lanterns that touched off the
Revolutionary War. 27 The lanterns, arranged for by Paul Revere, signaled the movement of British
troops up the Cha rles River to Cambridge to begin a march to Lexington. 28 The shot heard round the
world was fired on Lexington Green the following day. 29 Currently, the 280 year old church has a
23

Id. at 3.
Partners for Sacred Places, Lieberman Announces National List of Sacred Places to Save (2002), at
http://www.sacredplaces.org/ten_places.html#2. Lieberman was the Democratic sponsor of crafting a compromise version
of earlier legislation passed in the House of Representatives that would allow religious groups to accept public funds in
order to operate faith-based social services. Elizabeth Becker, Lieberman Joins Bush Bid To Push Aid-to-Charity Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2001, A11.
25
National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, at 2.
26
Id.
27
“Paul Revere,” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2003), see generally, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Paul Revere’s Ride, in
The Home Book of Verse 2,422 (selected & arranged by Burton E. Stevenson, 9th ed. 1950).
28
“Paul Revere,” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2003).
29
Id.
24
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congregation of 150 members, yet because of its historical status, the church has more costs to repair
its forty-three clear windows and to stay open for sightseers than its congregation and visitors donate. 30
The Old North Church was the first religious institution to be awarded a grant under the Save
America’s Treasures program. 31
The Mount Bethel Baptist Church in Washington, D.C. is another example of a church with an
important place in our history. 32 Former slaves established the congregation in 1875. 33 The church
and its congregation were deeply involved in the Civil Rights movement, particularly Martin Luther
King’s 1963 March on Washington, when busloads of protestors camped out and made placards at the
church. 34 The National Trust for Historic Preservation has put the Baptist church, built in 1902, on
their annual list of national landmarks in need of preservation, as the small congregation cannot afford
both to provide much- needed services to the community and to upkeep its historic building. 35
The historic Baltimore Cathedral, built from 1806 to 1821, is one further examp le of the
integral role houses of worship can play in the development of our country. The Basilica of the
National Shrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary stands as a symbol of the burgeoning
country’s religious freedom, as it is not only the first major religious building constructed in America
after the adoption of the Constitution, but also America’s first cathedral. 36 Three prominent Americans
guided the Cathedral’s design and architecture: John Carroll, the country’s first bishop, later
Archbishop of Baltimore, and cousin of Charles Carroll, who was the only Catholic to sign the
Declaration of Independence; Benjamin Henry Latrobe, the first Architect of the U.S. Capitol; and
30

The Old North Church Guidebook , at http://www.oldnorth.com/guid.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
See News Release, supra note 3.
32
Although this Church has been listed as endangered by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, see infra note 33, no
grant from the Save America’s Treasures program has been publicly requested.
33
National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Trust Calls D.C.’s Mount Bethel Baptist Church “Poster Child” of
National Epidemic, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/news/docs/20030529_11most_urbanmountbethel.html (last visited Mar.
19, 2004).
34
U.S. Department of State, March on Washington, at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/civilrights/anniversary/mow04.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004).
35
National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Trust Calls D.C.’s Mount Bethel Baptist Church “Poster Child” of
National Epidemic, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/news/docs/20030529_11most_urbanmountbethel.html, supra note 33.
36
Baltimore Basilica, Basilica of the National Shrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, The History of
Americas First Cathedral, at http://www.baltimorebasilica.org/index2.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
31
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President Thomas Jefferson, whose advice and counsel guided Latrobe. 37 For more than 100 years,
until the success of the American Revolution, the Catholic Church in England’s colonies was a
persecuted minority. 38 After the Revolution, leaders wanted to build a cathedral to celebrate their
newfound religious freedom in America. 39 Today, the Basilica’s historic trust has applied for a grant
under the Save America’s Treasures program as it hopes to raise funds to restore the national landmark
to the original concept of its principle architect, Benjamin Latrobe. 40
A final example of a religious institution important to our nation’s history was recently
awarded $375,000 from Save America’s Treasures, which would have been prohibited before the
recent change in federal policy. 41 Touro Synagogue, dedicated in 1762 in Newport, Rhode Island, is
the oldest synagogue in the United States and the only one that survives from the colonial era. 42 The
synagogue was designed by Peter Harrison, America’s first professional architect. 43
Touro Synagogue stands as a testament to the importance of religious tolerance in our nation’s
beginning. In 1790, President George Washington’s visited the Synagogue and in his letter “To the
Hebrew Congregation in Newport Rhode Island,” the President proclaimed that the United States
“gives bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.”44 John F. Kennedy reaffirmed the
importance of the Synagogue saying that it “is not only the oldest Synagogue in America, but also one
of the oldest symbols of Liberty.”45 According to the Touro Synagogue Foundation, this historic
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Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.; Frank Langfitt, Basilica Finds Itself at Center of a Constitutional Quandary; Public Grants Raise Issue of ChurchState Separation, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 24, 2003, at 1A.
41
Margaret Foster, Save America’s Treasures Grant Recipients Announced, PRESERVATION ONLINE, available at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/magazine/archives/arc_news/112003.htm (November 20, 2003).
42
Rabbi Theodore Lewis, HISTORY OF TOURO SYNAGOGUE, available at http://www.tourosynagogue.org (last visited Mar.
19, 2004).
43
Id.
44
George Washington, Letter from George Washington in response to Moses Seixas, available at
http://www.tourosynagogue.org/GWLetter1.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
45
The Touro Synagogue Foundation, Save Touro Synagogue,
http://www.tourosynagogue.org/capital_campaign.php?str=Save%20Touro%20Synagogue (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
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structure is in “dire need of critical repairs and costly improvements,” including efforts to address
“long-standing structural problems.”46
2. Community Contributions
“In our nation’s time of need . . . it should be clearer than ever what our churches, synagogues,
mosques and temples mean to our communities. They are much more than houses of worship. They
are anchoring centers of community service,” Joseph Lieberman has said. 47 Beyond their physical ties
to the community, these institutions provide significant and necessary services to their communities. 48
A survey conducted in over 100 congregations in six cities found that more than 90% of inner-city
houses of worship serve as community centers that provide services to people in need, on average
more than one in five of whom is not a congregation member. 49 Indeed, “[t]he average congregation
provides over 5,300 hours of volunteer support.”50 This translates into a value of an average of
$140,000 per year from these institutions, sixteen times what they receive from the people who use
these spaces. 51
This research also shows that a congregation’s ability to serve the community is based upon its
facilities. 52 Indeed, over 76% of all congregation-based community services take place in an historic
property. 53 During his tenure as Director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community

46

The Touro Synagogue Foundation, Restoration of Touro, at
http://www.tourosynagogue.org/conservation.php?str=Restoration%20of%20Touro (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
47
Partners for Sacred Places, Lieberman Announces National List of Sacred Places to Save (2002), at
http://www.sacredplaces.org/ten_places.html#2.
48
See National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22,
at 3; Daniel P. Hart, God’s Work, Caesar’s Wallet: Solving the Constitutional Conundrum of Government Aid to FaithBased Charities, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 1089, 1091-92 n.10 (citing Ram A. Cnaan et al., THE NEWER DEAL: SOCIAL WORK AND
RELIGION IN PARTNERSHIP (1999) (discussing increasingly important role of religious congregations and sectarian agencies
in providing social services and calling for “limited partnership” between social work and religion in helping those in
need); Marvin Olasky, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992) (calling for return to social services system
operated by religious charities instead of government bureaucracies); Joseph P. Shapiro & Andrea R. Wright, Can
Churches Save America?, U.S. NEWS & W ORLD REPORT , Sept. 9, 1996, at 46-53 (discussing increasing call by politicians
for allowing religious charities to provide more of social safety net)).
49
Diane Cohen & A. Robert Jaeger, SACRED PLACES AT RISK 5 (Partners for Sacred Places ED., 1998); National Trust for
Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, at 3.
50
Cohen & Jaeger, supra note 49, at 5.
51
Id.
52
National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, at 3.
53
Id.
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Initiatives, John DiIulio has said that “[l]etting sacred places crumble or close – failing to give them
the corporate, philanthropic and other support the y need to keep the walls from falling and the pipes
from bursting is tantamount to losing millions and millions of dollars a year in vitally needed antipoverty and community-building efforts.”

54

3. The Threat
Many inner-city congregations have been forced to make difficult choices between providing
necessary community services or preserving their historic properties as they struggle to make ends
meet. 55 Demographic changes in the last half-century have lead to severe declines in membership, and
thus, financial resources. 56 As a result, crucial repairs have frequently been postponed and the deferred
maintenance has lead to roof leaks, plumbing and electrical problems, and other severe structural
concerns. 57 In a representative group of ten historic urban houses of worship in one of the poorest
census tracks in North Philadelphia, for example, the average inner-city facility faces repairs in the
range of $1 million to $2 million. 58 The Partners for Sacred Places estimate that 20% of all historic
houses of worship are expected to suffer partial collapse or worse in the next five years. 59
II. THE FEDERAL SCHEME: NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT AND THE
SAVE AMERICA’S TREASURES PROGRAM
A.

National Historic Preservation Act
In 1966, Congress, motivated by at least two concerns, enacted the National Historic

Preservation Act (“NHPA”). 60 The first concern was the recognition that large numbers of historic
structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed with little or no consideration of their value as

54

Id. at 4.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Cohen & Jaeger, supra note 49.
59
Id.
60
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470, et seq. (2000).
55
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historic properties or the possibility of preserving the properties in economically productive ways. 61
The second consideration was a belief that structures with historic, cultural, or architectural
significance enhance the quality of life for the community. 62 As such, Congress declared the purposes
of the NHPA to include in part that:
(1) the spirit and direction of the nation are founded upon and reflected in its
historic heritage;
(2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living
part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of
orientation to the American people; . . .
(4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its
vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and
energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of
Americans;
(7) although the major burdens of historic preservation have been borne and major
effects initiated by private agencies and individuals, and both should continue to
play a vital role, it is nevertheless necessary and appropriate for the Federal
Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs and activities, to
give maximum encouragement to support by private means, and to assist State
and local governments and the Nation Trust for Historic Preservation in the
United States to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and
activities. 63
In keeping with these purposes, the NHPA authorizes the Department of the Interior to
provide grants to owners of historic properties and to the states for preserving historic properties.
These programs require that any property receiving such grants must be listed on the National
Register of Historic Places, (“National Register”) a list maintained by the Secretary of the Interior of
“district, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture,
archeology, engineering, and culture.”64 The criteria for evaluating a property for listing on the
National Register are set out in the applicable regulations and include consideration of:
“[t]he quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology,
engineering, and culture as present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects

61

Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978) (explaining the purposes underlying the national,
state and local level historic preservation legislation).
62
Id.
63
16 U.S.C. § 470-1.
64
16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A).
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that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and
association and:
(a) that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the
broad patterns of out history; or
(b) that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
(c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of
construction or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high
artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose
components may lack individual distinction; or
(d) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory
or history. 65
A property need only satisfy one of the four criteria for listing on the National Register. 66
It is important to note that under current Department of Interior regulations governing inclusion
in the National Register, historical religious properties must meet a higher standard than historic
secular properties. The guidelines provide that properties “owned by religious institutions or used for
religious purposes” are “[o]rdinarily” deemed ineligible for the National Register. 67 Only under an
exception contained in the regulations for “religious property deriving primary significance from
architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance,” could a religious property be listed on the
National Register.

68

If a religious property meets these heightened standards, however, a 1992

amendment to the NHPA specifically provides that “grants may be made under this subsection for the
preservation, stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote religion,
and seeks to protect those qualities that are historically significant.”69 Even after this amendment was
passed, however, and until the 2003 Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, the executive branch
declined to provide grants to religious properties. 70

65

36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2004).
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
16 U.S.C. § 470a(e)(4).
70
See, e.g. Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that Save America’s Treasures grant was
awarded to Old North Church, but the Park Service reversed its position shortly thereafter relying upon Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, supra note 6).
66
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Designation as a historic property may impose certain burdens and responsibilities on the
property owner. The NHPA imposes certain restrictions on the federal government when a federal
“undertaking” or “licensed” activity may affect a National Register property. 71 The federal agency
involved must consult with the federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and must consider
and take into account the effect on the historic property. 72 Although listing on the National Register
does not itself affect what a private property owner may do with his property, designation as a historic
property can have significant ramifications under relevant state and local laws. 73
B.

Save America’s Treasures Program
The Save America’s Treasures program is a national effort to protect “America’s threatened

cultural treasures, including historic structures, collections, works of art, maps and journals that
document and illuminate the history and culture of the United States.”74 Established by Executive
Order in February 1998 by President Clinton, Save America’s Treasures was originally founded as the
centerpiece of the White House National Millennium Commemoration and as a public-private
partnership that included the White House, the National Park Service, and the National Trust for
Historic Preservation. 75 The Program provides matching grants for preservation of “the enduring
symbols of American tradition that define us as a nation.”76 Matching Save America’s Treasures

71

16 U.S.C. § 470a(f).
Id.
73
See, e.g., Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1101 (1981), et seq.; Landmark’s
Preservation Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq.
Another controversy closely related to the one at issue in this Note is whether placing requirements upon a house
of worship once it is deemed a historic landmark is an infringement upon the free exercise of religion in violation of the
Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Catherine Maxson, “Their Preservation is Our Sacred Trust” -- Judicially Mandated Free
Exercise Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances under Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L. REV. 205
(2003); Laura S. Nelson, Remove Not the Ancient Landmark: Legal Protection for Historic Religious Properties in an Age
of Religious Freedom Legislation, 21 CARDOZO L. RE V. 721, 730 (1999); Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry v.
Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 TEMP . L. REV. 91, 93 (1992);
Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and
Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401, 402 (1991). This issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
74
Exec. Order No. 13072, 63 FR 6041 (Feb. 2, 1998).
75
Id. The Program was established in 1998 pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§
470 to 470x-6 (2000). Funding for the Program is provided by the Historic Preservation Fund, which was created by the
NHPA. See 16 U.S.C. § 470h.
76
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-63, 115 Stat. 414, 425
(2001).
72
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grants are available for work on “na tionally significant intellectual and cultural artifacts and nationally
significant historic structures and sites.”77 Past grantees include Montpelier, the home of James
Madison in Montpelier Station, Virginia; the Star Spangled Banner at the Smithsonian Institute;
Harriet Tubman Residence and Home for the Aged in Auburn, New York; and Ellis Island in New
Jersey. 78
Grants require a dollar- for-dollar non- federal match, which can be in the form of cash or
donated services. 79 The minimum grant request for collections projects is $50,000; the minimum grant
request for historic property projects is $250,000 and the maximum grant request for all projects is $1
million. 80 In 2003, the average federal grant award to collections was $172,000 and the average award
to historic properties was $268,000. 81
Six categories of entities, including both public and private institutions, are eligible to apply for
Save America’s Treasures grants: federal agencies funded by the Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act; other federal agencies collaborating with a nonprofit partner to
preserve the historic properties or collections owned by the federal agency; non-profit, tax-exempt
501(c)(3), U.S organizations; units of state or local government; federally recognized Indian Tribes;
and historic properties and collections associated with active religious organizations. 82 Applications
are reviewed and ranked on the basis of extensive criteria, primarily related to historical significance. 83
Most importantly, the applicant must demonstrate the property’s “national significance,” as that term is
77

Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions at 1, available at
http://www.pcah.gov/GuidelinesSAT2003.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
Guidelines and application materials for the 2004 grant program will be available in early 2004. See National
Parks Service, Save America’s Treasures Federal Grants, at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
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Save America’s Treasures, Official Project Profiles, at http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/profiles.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004).
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Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra note 77, at 1;
National Parks Service, Save America’s Treasures Federal Grants, at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures, supra note 77.
80
National Parks Service, Save America’s Treasures Federal Grants, at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures, supra note 77.
81
Id.
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Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra note 77, at 1.
83
Id. at 4.
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defined by the Guidelines. 84 The criteria set out by the Guidelines for “national significance,”
although similar to those for listing on the National Register, focus more acutely on the property’s
value to the nation as a whole, and not simply its value in a particular community. 85 Applications not
meeting this criterion will not receive further consideration. 86 This requires a showing that the
property possesses “exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the intellectual and
cultural heritage and the built environment of the United States,” that it possesses “a high degree of
integrity,” and that it is associated with events, persons, ideas, or ideals that are especially significant
in American history. 87 In addition, to qualify as nationally significant, the historic property must have
been either designated as a National Historic Landmark or listed as a place of “national significance”
in the National Register, or be deemed eligible for such designation or listing. 88 In addition to
“national significance,” Save America’s Treasures grant applicants must also demonstrate that the
historic property is “threatened” or “endangered,” or that it has an “urgent preservation and/or
conservation need.”89 Additionally, the proposed project “must address the threat and must have
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Id. at 4. Guidelines quality of national significance is ascribed to collections and historic properties that possess
exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the intellectual and cultural heritage and the built environment of
the United States, that possess a high degree of integrity and:
• That are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to, and are identified with, or that
outstandingly represent the broad patterns of United States history and culture and from which an
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• That are associated importantly with the lives of persons nationally significant in the United States history or
culture; or,
• That represent great historic, cultural, artistic or scholarly ideas or ideals of the American people; or,
• That embody the distinguishing characteristics of a resource type
o that is exceptionally valuable for the study of a period or theme of United States history or culture; or
o that represents a significant, distinctive and exceptional entity whose components may lack individual
dis tinction but that collectively form an entity of exceptional historical, artistic or cultural
significance (e.g., an historic district with national significance), or
o that outstandingly commemorate or illustrate a way of life or culture; or,
• That have yielded or may be likely to yield information of major importance by revealing or by shedding light
upon periods or themes of United States history or culture.
85
Compare 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (National Register “Criteria considerations” with Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic
Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and
Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra note 77, at 4.
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Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual
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Id.; see source cited supra note 77.
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Id. at 5.
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Id.
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educational, interpretive, or training value and a clear public benefit (for example, historic places open
for visitation or collections ava ilable for public viewing or scholarly research).”90 Finally, the project
must be “feasible (i.e., able to be accomplished within the proposed activities, schedule and budget
described in the application), and the applicant must demonstrate ability to comp lete the project and
match the federal funds.”91
After the Park Service completes its ranking of the applicants, 92 a panel of experts with
professional expertise in fields such as history, preservation, conservation, archeology rank
applications and make funding recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior. 93 In order to insulate
the panel members from external influence, the Department of the Interior does not disclose their
identity to the public. 94 The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the President’s Committee
on the Arts and the Humanities, will select applicants and forward those selections to the House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations for concurrence. 95
Applicants that qualify for a grant under the substantive criteria discussed above must also
satisfy a number of administrative requirements before a grant will be awarded. Because projects
funded by the Program are “undertakings” within the meaning of the Historic Preservation Act, 96 the
Park Service requires that grant recipie nts consult with their State Historic Preservation Officer and the
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Id.
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Advisory Council on Historic Preservation prior to the receipt of funds. 97 In addition, grant recipients
must agree to encumber the title to their property with a fifty year covenant that runs with the land that
provides that the owners “shall repair, maintain, and administer the premises so as to preserve the
historical integrity of the features, materials, appearance, workmanship, and setting that made the
property eligible for the Nationa l Register of Historic Places.”98 Finally, because grants for the repair
and development of historic properties are provided “only for the benefit of the public,” “interior work
(other than mechanical systems such as plumbing or wiring), or work not visible from the public way,
must be open to the public at least 12 days a year during the 50-year term of the preservation easement
or covenant.”99 There is no requirement of notice to the public of the property’s historical
significance. 100
Save America’s Treasures grantees must also keep detailed records of their expenditures and
are subject to audit by the government to ensure that the Save America’s Treasures grants are spent
only for designated purposes. 101 The Act expressly requires grantees to maintain “records which fully
disclose the disposition by the beneficiary of the proceeds of such assistance, the total cost of the
project or undertaking in connection with which such assistance is given or used, and the amount and
nature of that portion of the cost of the project or undertaking supplied by other sources, and such other
records as will facilitate an effective audit.”102 These requirements ensure that federal funds are not
used for unauthorized purposes. 103
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Nationally Significant Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application
Instructions, supra note 77, at 3.
98
Id. at 3-4.
99
Id.
100
See generally id.
101
16 U.S.C. § 470e (2000).
102
Id.
103
Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, supra note 6, at 3.

16

III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT:
SHIFT TO NEUTRALISM
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”104 Religious liberty and separation of church and
state are the cornerstones of the American way of life. The Framers of the Constitution designed the
First Amendment’s religion clauses to embrace two key concepts: the government will not endorse or
oppose any particular religious viewpoint (or religion generally), and will not interfere with the right of
citizens to practice their faith. James Madison, the father of the United States Constitution, once
observed, “The [religious] devotion of the people has been manifestly increased by the total separation
of the church from the state.”105 Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black also expressed the purpose and
function of the Establishment Clause when he said that it rests “on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion.”106
The issue at the core of this Note is whether facially neutral laws that provide funding to
religious institutions, and are not shown to have been applied for the purpose of helping, hurting, or
discriminating among religions, are an establishment of religion prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. Namely, may government support for the preservation of historically important buildings
include religious buildings?
Two schools of thought have developed regarding this kind of support for religious institutions.
Separationism, described as the creation of a “wall of separation” between church and state, has been
the dominant theme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for fifty years. 107 According to strict
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U.S. CONST . amend. I.
Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2, 1819), in 8 THE W RITINGS OF JAMES M ADISON 1808-1819, at 432
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908); see generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s belief that religion is “a matter which lies
solely between man and his God” and that the Establishment Clause essentially builds a “wall of separation between church
and state.”)
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See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (viewing the purpose of the Establishment Clause as resting on the belief
that “a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion”).
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See infra text accompanying notes 123-143.
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separationist theory, the government may not support, assist, or otherwise promote religion or religious
institutions because of the inseparability of the secular and sectarian characters of such
organizations. 108 Over the past twenty years, however, Supreme Court jurisprudence has shifted
towards the neutralism theory. 109 Neutralism espouses that the “Constitution requires, at a minimum,
neutrality not hostility toward religion,”110 that the government may not confer a disfavored status
upon religion, but may provide aid to religion and religious institutions if done in a neutral and nondiscriminatory manner. As such, neutralists argue that the government must include religious
institutions in social programs on the same terms as other institutions, and that the religious identity of
those institutions should not be of concern to government as long as private parties create that religious
content and no one is coerced into religious participation. 111
The administration’s change in policy regarding historic preservation grants to religious
buildings feeds into this debate about the correct meaning of the Establishment Clause between these
two competing interpretations. 112 Although the Supreme Court has recently redefined its own
conception of the Establishment Clause, 113 Justice Thomas believes that this apparent, yet incomplete
doctrinal shift has caused “growing confusion among the lower courts.”114 As such, he suggests that
the Court “cannot long avoid addressing the important issues”115 illustrated, for example, by the
question of whether the government may provide grants to religious historic properties.
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Id. Note that the Court has decided Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), since Justice Thomas made this statement.
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A.

The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to give protection from the

“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”116 In
1971, the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurzman set out a three-part test to assess a statute’s
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. 117 For a statute to be consistent with the
Establishment Clause, the law: (1) must have a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary effect that
neither materially inhibits nor advances religion; and (3) must not excessively entangle religion and
governmental institutions. 118 The Lemon test, however, has been applied in an inconsistent manner,
thus rendering the test less than dispositive. 119 Although the test has been ignored by some Justices,
and sharply criticized by others, 120 it has been recently applied in a modified form more in accord with
the neutralist theory. 121 In fact, the same year as the Lemon test was adopted, the Supreme Court
cautioned about applying the test too inflexibly: “[t]he standards should rather be viewed as guidelines
with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clause have been impaired.
And as we have noted in Lemon, candor compels the acknowledgement that we can only dimly

generally Anthony Kovalchick, Educational Aid Programs under the Establishment Clause: The Need for the U.S. Supreme
Court to Adopt the Rule Proposed by the Mitchell Plurality, 30 S.U. L. REV. 117, 185-86 (2003).
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Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)
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403 U.S. 203 (1997).
118
Id. at 612-13.
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See, e.g. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down state remedial education programs administered in part
in parochial schools); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislative chaplains).
120
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter have all criticized the Lemon test. Justice White, who
dissented from the decision in Lemon, also has strongly criticized the test. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69
(1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 655-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “persuasive criticism of Lemon has
emerged”); Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1990) (statement of nominee); Lamb’s Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (Justice Scalia lamented that the test is “like some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.”
Justice Scalia accused the Lemon test of “stalking” Establishment Clause jurisprudence and pointed out to the Court that
“when we wish to strike down a practice [Lemon] forbids, we invoke it ...; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we
ignore it entirely.”)
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Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality).
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perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional
adjudication.”122
B.

Separationist Doctrine
During its separationist period, the Supreme Court limited direct money grants that went to

religious institutions. The cases below are the main cases in which the Court has considered the
constitutionality of such grants. They demonstrate that the Court held that the Establishment Clause
required that aid from governments to religious institutions had to be used to support only secular
activities, and then only if the religious character of the institution was not pervasive.
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of governmental support for buildings associated
with religious institutions in 1899, 123 more than a century after the First Amendment was ratified. 124 In
Bradfield v. Roberts, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that provided direct funds to a hospital
run by the Roman Catholic Church but devoted exclusively to caring for those with contagious
diseases. 125 The Court focused on the building’s purposes, and not the identity of the owner, to find
that because those purposes were secular, there was no establishment of religion. 126
At the height of the separationist era in the Supreme Court, the Court in Tilton v. Richardson
sustained a federal statute that provided construction grants to religious colleges and universities for
libraries and other buildings devoted to science, music, and art. 127 The program explicitly excluded aid
to facilities “used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship.”128 The Court concluded
that because the schools that had received the grants had not been shown to be pervasively sectarian,
122

Titlon v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 368, 394 (1983) (“Our cases have
also emphasized that [Lemon] provides ‘no more than [a] helpful signpost’ in dealing with Establishment Clause
challenges.”).
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and had maintained the federally supported buildings in a secular fashion, no constitutional violation
had occurred. 129 Although the Court upheld most of this program, it unanimously struck down a
provision that would have returned the new building to the exclusive control of its owner after twenty
years without restriction on religious use. 130 Because this reversion meant that after twenty years the
government might be effectively subsidizing worship or instruction, the Court held that the restriction
on religious use must extend for the life of the building. 131 The Court also noted that in such cases, the
“crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the
legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion.”132
Two years later, the Court further solidified its separationist doctrine by extending the “secular
use” principle of Bradfield and Tilton. The Court in Hunt v. McNair upheld state issuance of revenue
bonds for use at a religiously affiliated college, but only on the condition that the financed structures
never be used for religious worship or instruction. 133 The Court found that the purpose of the law was
secular, and there was no evidence that religion was so pervasive in the college that a substantial
portion of its functions was religious. 134 Thus, the Court held, the primary effect of the law as applied
to the college would not be to advance religion. 135 “The Court has not accepted the recurrent argument
that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources
on religious ends.”136 In addition, there was no evidence of potential excessive entanglement because
the state would not become involved unless the college failed to make its rent payments. 137
On the same day, in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the
Court reaffirmed the principle that the Establishment Clause prohibits government construction or
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repair of buildings used for religious worship or instruction. 138 This case most directly addresses the
issue of direct government funding for existing buildings used for religious purposes. In Nyquist, the
Court held unconstitutional New York State’s program of “maintenance and repair” grants for the
upkeep of religious schools and equip ment. 139 The grants were allocated per student, but were only
available to private, nonpublic schools in low- income areas, “all or practically all of which were
Catholic.”140 The court held that the maintenance and repair provision violated the Establishment
Clause because its effect, inevitably, was to subsidize and advance the religious mission of these
schools. 141 Although noting that “an indirect and incidental benefit to religious institutions has never
been thought a sufficient defect to warrant the inva lidation of a state law,”142 the Court reasoned that
“if the state may not erect buildings in which religious activities take place, it may not maintain such
buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair.”143 The Court has never repudiated
Nyquist,144 and thus, it likely stands as the relevant precedent for government support for structures
used primarily for religious purposes.
C.

Current State of Establishment Clause Doctrine and Doctrinal Shift Toward Neutralism
The Supreme Court has notably shifted towards neutralism in its recent cases involving

government assistance to religious schools. In these cases, the Court has effectively renounced the
notion that all assistance to secular institutions is forbidden. None of these cases, however, relate
directly to governmental support for religious buildings. Therefore, the following cases are only
suggestive of the direction of Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
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In Agostini v. Felton, the question was whether public employees could provide on siteremedial instruction to students attending sectarian school in educationally deprived areas. 145 The
purpose of the program was to provide the same opportunities for remedial instruction as were
available to public school students. 146 The Court upheld the program and in doing so reaffirmed but
modified the Lemon test. 147 Under the modified Lemon test, courts look to: (1) whether the
government had a secular purpose; and (2) whether the aid has the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. 148 Three “primary criteria” are used in the “effects test” inquiry: (1) whether the aid results in
governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the aid program defines its recipients by reference to
religion; and (3) whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and
religion. 149 The Court made clear that government aid to religious institutions is less likely to
subsidize religion (and thus result in governmental indoctrination) where “the aid is allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.”150 The Court emphasized that the
program in this case was neutral from the perspective of religion, was directed at supporting students
and not institutions, and was carefully designed to avoid promoting the sectarian goals of the schools at
which the program operated. 151
In Mitchell v. Helms, the Court addressed whether a federal program that provides government
aid in materials and equipment to public and private schools, was a law respecting an establishment of
religion. 152 The law required that all items purchased under the program had to be secular in nature
and no item purchased under the program could be used for sectarian purposes. 153 The Court upheld
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the program, but without a majority opinion. 154 The four-person plurality adopted a neutralist
perspective, applying the two-part test adopted in Agostini. 155 First, did the government program seek
to indoctrinate religion? 156 In answer to this question, the Court held that because the equipment and
materials were themselves secular and that sectarian uses were forbidden, the program did not seek to
indoctrinate religion. 157 Second, the Court asked if the recipients of the aid were selected by reference
to religion, and found that the law determined eligibility neutrally and based on private choices, and as
such, recipients were not selected on the basis of religious criteria. 158
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the opinion. 159 O’Connor agreed that
the aid program was constitutional, but disagreed with the “singular importance” that the plurality had
placed on neutrality. 160 O’Connor believed the constitutionality of the program resulted from the
confluence of several factors: the neutral, secular criteria under which the aid was awarded; the fact
that the aid supplemented and did not supplant the existing curriculum; the fact that no religious
schools received government funds; the fact that the items purchased and loaned were secular; the fact
that evidence of actual diversion was de minimis; and the inclusion in the program of adequate
safeguards against diversion. 161 As such, O’Connor concluded that the program neither advanced nor
inhibited religion. 162 By combining the plurality and the concurrence, it seems that the government
may under some circumstances provide religious institutions with aid, even if it is potentially divertible
to religious purposes.
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IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY
A. Prior Policy
The former federal policy, which seems to date back to the Carter administration and was
explicitly adopted by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, prohibited federal grants for
repair or preservation of properties dedicated to worship or religious instruction. 163 This policy was
memorialized in the 1995 opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel by Assistance Attorney General
Walter Dellinger. 164 The opinion concludes that the “question of government aid to religious
institutions is a very difficult one. . . . We think, however, that a court applying current precedent is
most likely to conclude that the direct award of historic preservation grants to churches and other
pervasively sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause.”165
The opinion makes three major points in support of its finding. First, Supreme Court precedent
suggests that federal grants may not be provided to “pervasively sectarian” institutions. 166 The reason
for this prohibition is the risk that where secular and religious activities are “inextricably intertwined,”
any government aid, even if limited to a secular purpose, will inevitably advance the religious purpose
as well. 167 The assumption is that secular elements cannot be separated from the overall religious
mission of the ins titution. 168 Secondly, any effort to distinguish the sectarian from the religious
elements of active houses of worship is not feasible and may require “monitoring for the subtle or
overt presence of religious matter” prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 169 Such an effort would
necessitate an inquiry into the religious doctrine or beliefs that may impermissibly entangle the
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government with religion. 170 Finally, this opinion argues that historic preservation grants are not
generally available, but rather are awarded on the basis of subjective criteria requiring an evaluation of
historical importance and architectural and artistic distinction. 171 The application of subjective criteria
in the context of a competitive grant program may require or reflect governmental judgments about the
relative value of religious enterprises. 172 The opinion concludes that although recent Supreme Court
precedent has “emphasized the importance of neutrality in upholding governmental programs against
Establishment Clause challenge,” there is no authority to depart from the policy that funds should not
be provided directly to religious institutions. 173
B. 2003 Opinion
On May 28, 2003, the Office of Legal Counsel released its opinion concerning historic
preservation grants to places of religious worship and instruction. 174 The new opinion reversed the
long-standing policy that Supreme Court precedent prohibited such grants. This opinion concludes
that the Establishment Clause does not forbid grants to houses of worship when they are among a
broad range of beneficiaries, not defined by reference to religion, in a program with neutral application
and broad, secular goals. 175 It seems that, given the indecision and doctrinal confusion in the Supreme
Court, the opinion attempted to answer any potential constitutional question that may be asked.176
First, the opinion argues that the federal government has a substantial interest in preserving all
sites of historic significance to the nation, whether those sites are secular or sectarian. 177 This interest
makes these grants distinguishable from those given to educational institutions, where the concerns
170
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about religious indoctrination are particularly strong. 178 As such, the historic preservation grants
should not be subjected to as rigorous a scrutiny as that given to religious educational institutions. 179
Second, Save America’s Treasures grants are analogous to aid that qualifies as “general
governmental services,” such as police protection and fire fighting because they preserve landmarks of
nationwide significance. 180 These governmental services may be provided to religious institutions if
they are made available on the basis of neutral criteria. 181 If these services were denied to religious
institutions, religion would be handicapped. 182 In this case, the class of beneficiaries is so broad as to
encompass any and all kinds of historic structure whether owned by public or private sources, secular
or sectarian. 183 Thus, the breadth of eligibility suggests that these historic preservation grants are
simply a permissible general government service. 184
The opinion next emphasized the neutrality of the criteria for selecting Save America’s
Treasures grantees. 185 The opinion suggests that although a number of the criteria allow for discretion,
they are amenable to neutral application. 186 The opinion argues that the neutrality of the criteria, with
the limited allowance for subjective decision-making, and the diverse makeup of structures that have
been preserved under the Program, indicate that the Program is not skewed toward religion. 187
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The opinion felt that for the above reasons, no reasonable observer would feel that this Program
was an endorsement of religion. 188 Rather, an informed observer would understand that a government
grant from this Program is not a payment for the endorsement of religion, but rather a payment for the
preservation of a structure that is important to the country’s history. 189
The opinion emphasizes that the Save America’s Treasures grants are not to be used to promote
religion as set out by statute and regulation. 190 Audit rules and other aspects of the Program work to
ensure that Save America’s Treasures grants are used for their stated purpose and not used to promote
religion. 191
The opinion next analogizes this Establishment Clause issue here with the Supreme Court
jurisprudence in two separate but related doctrines, free speech and the free exercise of religion. 192
The opinion notes the move towards neutralism in these analogous areas. 193 The opinion first
describes a line of cases that hold that the Free Speech Clause does not permit the government to deny
religious groups equal access to the government’s own property even where those groups will use that
property for religious worship or instruction. 194 The opinion then suggests that the denial of grants to
religious institutions because of their religious identity is to single out religious activity for special and
burdensome treatment, a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 195 The opinion here argues that parallel
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Supreme Court doctrine prohibits the discrimination against religion under the Free Exercise Clause.196
To deny houses of worship otherwise available grants directly implicates that anti-discrimination
jurisprudence. 197 The opinion suggests that the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift towards nondiscrimination against religion in these two analogous areas suggests that the Court would carry that
same principle over into its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The opinion concludes by suggesting that even though the relevant Supreme Court precedent,
Tilton and Nyquist have not been explicitly overruled, the Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
evolved since those decisions were rendered, and as such, they may no longer be good law. 198
Agostini and Mitchell overturned many principles that underlie the decisions in Tilton and Nyquist. 199
Specifically, the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine, that held that there are certain religious institutions
in which religion is so pervasive that no governmental aid may be provided to them, because the ir
performance of even secular acts will be infused with religious purposes, no longer enjoys support
from a majority of the court. 200
V. HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The opinion identifies policy considerations and considers factors that may be relevant in a
constitutional challenge to the Save America’s Treasures grant program. This Note, while agreeing
with the conclusion of the opinion, attempts to more concretely ground the many arguments made by
the opinion in Supreme Court jurisprudence. This analysis may more accurately reflect an actual
judicial response to such a challenge. It is important to note, and has been demonstrated above, that
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religious uses to invalidate direct aid to schools and explaining that “presumptions of religious indoctrination are normally
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the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in flux, with a shift toward neutralism. 201 Thus, this Note
suggests two different approaches the Court may take in approaching a grant to a historic religious
institution under the Save America’s Treasures grant program. 202 First, this Note will consider whether
the grant program is constitutional under the doctrine of direct aid of funding to religious institutions.
Secondly, this Note will consider whether the grant program can be upheld as a general governmental
service.
A. Direct Aid Approach
The law of the Establishment Clause has been moving away from a regime of strict
separationism and toward a regime of neutrality. 203 The principles of Tilton and Nyquist have guided
federal policy for the past twenty years or more. There are reasons to believe, however, that the
Supreme Court may no longer adhere to the full sweep of this exclusion of structures devoted to
worship or religious instruction from government assistance. Thus, the opinion is correct that although
Tilton and Nyquist have not been overturned, they may no longer stand as good law. 204 The opinion,
however, should have gone further to apply the now relevant Mitchell test to the historic preservation
grants to determine their constitutionality. 205
Because the plurality opinion in Mitchell garnered only four votes, the controlling opinion is
the concurrence with the narrowest holding, here Justice O’Connor’s. 206 Taking these two opinions
together, it is clear that the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine has been overruled, no longer requiring
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religious institutions to segregate their religious activities to receive aid, 207 and has been replaced with
a question of “neutrality plus” from O’Connor’s concurring opinion. 208 O’Connor’s opinion suggests
that neutrality is a necessary and important consideration in judging Establishment Clause cases, but
that factor may not be sufficient in and of itself. 209 Instead, courts must examine whether actual
diversion of aid occurs and whether the “particular facts of each case” reveal that the Establishment
Clause has been violated. 210 As such, just as Justice O’Connor did in her concurrence in Mitchell, 211
the Court in this case would apply the modified Lemon test from Agostini v. Felton considering and
balancing each factor: (1) whether the government had a secular purpose; and (2) whether the aid has
the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 212 Three “primary criteria” are used in the “effects test”
inquiry: (1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the aid program defines
its recipients by reference to religion; and (3) whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement
between government and religion. 213
A. Secular Purpose Test
First, it is undisputed that the Save America’s Treasures Program has a secular purpose. 214 The
program is designed to preserve America’s historic resources without regard to their secular or
sectarian characters. 215 The grants are available, and have been available, to recipients of all sorts. 216
As such, the Program is in no way a vehicle for the advancement of religious purposes.
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B. Effects Test
Second ly, the grants do not have the effect of advancing religion. In order to determine effect,
the neutrality of the criteria used to assign the aid must first be evaluated. 217 It seems clear that the
criteria for determining grant eligibility are neutral on their face as none take religion into account in
any way. 218 The first criteria requires a showing of national significance, that the property has an
“exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the intellectual and cultural heritage and the
built environment of the United States,” that it possesses “a high degree of integrity,” that it is
associated with events, persons, ideas, or ideals that are especially significant in American history, and
that it is listed on the National Register or is eligible to be. 219 Here, in fact, it is more difficult for a
religious building to obtain this status, as they are “ordinarily” deemed ineligible for listing on the
Register unless that religious property derives “primary significance from architectural or artistic
distinction or historical importance.”220
Grant applicants must also demonstrate that the historic property is “threatened” or
“endangered,” or that it has an “urgent preservation and/or conservation need.”221 Additionally, the
proposed project “must address the threat and must have educational, interpretive, or training value and
a clear public benefit.”222 Finally, the project must be financially feasible. 223 These criteria clearly do
not consider religion.
Notably, the analysis in the opinion goes beyond the dictates of Mitchell to apply a novel
reasoning by evaluating the neutrality of the criteria as they may be applied. 224 The opinion asks to
216
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what extent the criteria leave room for an administrator with discretion to favor religion when
considering grant applications. 225 “We believe that the degree to which officials administering public
aid have discretion to favor (or disfavor) religious institutions – and, far more important, the manner in
which they exercise that discretion – are relevant to the aid’s constitutionality.”226 The opinion’s
analysis is logical in that even though criteria appear to be neutral, this appearance is insufficient
where a biased administrator could exercise his discretion to favor religion in practice. In the case of
this program, the opinion is correct to conclude that the limited discretion allowed within the criteria
does not leave room for favoritism. 227 In addition, although not recognized by the opinion, the
administrative oversight involved in the program would not allow a single administrator’s bias to be
acted upon. 228
Under the Mitchell plurality opinion, the Program’s secular purpose and its neutral criteria
would practically dispose of this case. 229 Under the analysis of Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer,
however, the neutrality of the Program remains a critical factor in considering its constitutionality, but
additional considerations must also weigh in favor of constitutionality. 230 Justice O’Connor noted that
the Court has “never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because
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of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid.”231 Instead, Justices O’Connor and
Breyer would hold that “neutrality is important, but it is by no means the only ‘axiom in the history
and precedent of the Establishment Clause.’”232 Instead, courts must examine whether actual diversion
of aid occurs and whether the particular facts of each case reveal that the Establishment Clause has
been violated. 233 As such, the next considerations are of the “primary criteria” used to determine
whether the grants program has the “effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”234
1. Indoctrination
Compelling arguments exist on both sides of the question of whether the aid appears to result in
governmental indoctrination. Agostini requires that the grant to a religious institution be based on
secular, neutral criteria to avoid the appearance that government is endorsing religion or funding
indoctrination. 235 Neutral criteria must also be considered with regard to the extent that the funding
will have a constitutionally impermissible effect by actually supporting religious indoctrination. 236
Justice O’Connor has specifically criticized past Supreme Court cases for “applying an irrebuttable
presumption that secular instructional materials and equipment would be diverted to use for religious
indoctrination.”237 Instead of focusing on this irrebuttable presumption that even the secular courses in
a religious school are “inescapably” religious, 238 Justice O’Connor would require those challenging a
statute to “prove that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.”239 Thus,
O’Connor requires a consideration of both whether there is the appearance that the government is
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endorsing religion, and also whether government funds are being diverted to actually support religious
indoctrination.
a. Appearance of Endorsement
The Mitchell plurality suggested that neutral criteria are sufficient to establish that the
government is not appearing to endorse religion: “If the religious, irreligious, and a-religious are all
alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular
recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.”240 Because the conc urring opinion
did not disagree with this point, it appears that neutral criteria to disburse aid is sufficient to assure that
such aid does not appear to be an endorsement of religion.
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In this case, as has been established, the

criteria used to evaluate applications are neutral and serve a secular purpose. 242
The opinion also suggests, although less than clearly, that there is less of a concern of the
appearance of endorsement where historic preservation grants are distributed to a wide range of
institutions to use strictly as opposed to those grants strictly limited to educational recipients. 243 This
distinction seems unnecessary because, in Mitchell, the plurality and the concurrence upheld aid that
was directed to only educational institutions, and specifically to religious primary and secondary
schools. 244 Thus, the Supreme Court has not required that grant programs have a range of recipients
that spans across many fields.
b. Actual Diversion of Funds
The opinion delineates the statutory and regulatory requirements that prevent Save America’s
Treasures grants from being used to promote religion. 245 The opinion, however, does not indicate how
this factor relates to the constitutionality of the grant program. In fact, these limits on the stricter
requirements for religious places to qualify for the National Register and thus be eligible for grants,
240
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and the auditing and covenant requirements after the grant has been awarded, are relevant to the second
prong of the Agostini test, whether the government aid is actually being used to support religion. 246
Justice O’Connor criticized the plurality in Mitchell for approving the “actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination.”247 She wrote that the Court has “long been concerned that
secular gove rnment aid not be diverted to the advancement of religion.”248 Actual diversion concerned
Justice O’Connor because if “religious indoctrination is supported by government assistance, the
reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government support for the
advancement of religion.”249 Justice O’Connor’s concerns with governmental aid to houses of
worship, therefore, would be lessened if these places did not actually use the aid for religious
purposes. 250
In this case, properties that are owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes
are eligible for Save America’s Treasures grants only if they “deriv[e] primary significance from
architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance,”251 and “[g]rants may be made . . . for the
preservation, stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote
religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are historically significant,”252 Thus, the Department
of the Interior may provide grants for the preservation of religious structures only insofar as such
preservation protects those structures’ historically significant components, and as such, grants are
limited to secular uses and solely to protect those non-religious historical elements of otherwise
religious buildings.
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Yet, the Tilton case involved higher education, 253 and in Nyquist, the program for secondary
schools was struck down. 254 By extension, could the Court find that religious indoctrination is even
more likely to occur in a house of worship – that when the government finances the preservation of a
house of worship in which religious indoctrination explicitly occurs, the government is effectively
financing “religious activities” forbidden by Justice O’Connor’s controlling opinion in Mitchell? 255 To
answer this question, it seems that given the Court’s recent jurisprudence, these holdings in Tilton and
Nyquist would not withstand further review. Rather, it seems that the Court is willing to uphold
government aid to an institution that engages in religious behavior and education, as long as the aid
itself is not actually used for that purpose. 256
Finally, other aspects of the Program ensure that Save America’s Treasures grants are provided
“only for the benefit of the public” and not used for religious purposes. 257 Grantees must agree to
encumber their property with a fifty year covenant to keep open to the public all portions of
rehabilitated structures that are not visible from the public way for twelve days a year, 258 and to
“repair, maintain, and administer the premises so as to preserve the historical integrity of the features,
materials, appearance, workmanship, and setting that made the property eligible for the National
Register of Historic Places.”259 To ensure compliance with these requirements, those receiving grants
must keep detailed records and are subject to audit by the government to ensure that the grants are used
only for designated purposes. 260 Thus, as Mitchell held that the government need not “have a failsafe
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mechanism capable of detecting any instance of diversion,”261 in this case, the safeguards against
sectarian diversion are more than constitutionally sufficient.
2. Recipients Defined on Basis of Religion
Agostini’s second criterion under the effects test, whether an aid program defines its recipients
by reference to religion, 262 is largely left unanswered by the opinion. 263 The plurality in Mitchell
explained that the second criterion is related to the first, as it considers the same facts as the neutrality
inquiry, 264 but asks whether the criteria for allocating the aid creates a financial incentive to undertake
religious indoctrination. 265 The plurality in Mitchell, and left unquestioned by the concurrence, holds
that “[s]uch an incentive is not present where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria
that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.”266
The historic preservation context has a unique answer to the question of whether direct grants
provide incentive to undertake religious indoctrination. First, no incentive exists for a property to
undertake religious activities because the grants are available on an equal basis to religious and secular
properties. 267 Secondly, in this case, no property is eligible for the grant unless it is at least fifty years
old and meets the other criteria for national significance. 268 As such, individual property owners have
little to no actual control over whether their property is eligible for a grant from this Program.
Therefore, because the grant criteria are neutral as to the activities in or uses of the historic properties,
the program creates no incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.
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3. Excessive Entanglement
The Court has explained that “[n]ot all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion. 269 Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we have always
tolerated some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be ‘excessive’ before it runs
afoul of the Establishment Clause.”270 As such, there is no basis to conclude that allowing active
religious structures to receive aid would “excessively entangle” church and state, because there is no
more governmental monitoring of grant recipients here than in other cases in which the Court has not
questioned the provision of aid under the entanglement prong. These programs have included the
review of the materials used by an adolescent counseling program set up by the religious institutions,
and monitoring of that program by periodic visits, 271 annual audits conducted by the state, 272 and
unannounced monthly visits by public supervisors. 273 Here, where the grants are limited to use on the
secular and historically significant portion of the religious properties, require maintenance for fifty
years, and only potential auditing are certainly less onerous burdens on religious institutions than those
that have already been deemed constitutionally acceptable. 274
4. Outcome
Under the modified Lemon test applied by the Agostini and Mitchell Courts, the historic
preservation grants to religious buildings would be upheld under the Establishment Clause. Yet,
although these federal grants may be provided to religious buildings, it seems clear that those funds
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cannot be used to rehabilitate any element of those buildings. Rather, both the relevant regulations 275
and the Establishment Clause 276 require that these grants be limited to the support of only secular
elements of the historic religious buildings. If the federal government funded the restoration of some
plainly religious element of a building that serves no purpose other than for religious conduct or
religious ornamentation, such as a crucifix or perhaps an altar, this would violate the Mitchell test as
having the effect of advancing religion277 as the grants appear to endorse religion because they actually
support religious indoctrination. 278 In addition, under Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mitchell, the
grants are impermissible because the funds are actually diverted to support religious indoctrination. 279
A closer question, in contrast, is whether the use of government funds to restore something less
obviously religious, such as stained glass windows, would have the effect of advancing religion. 280
Such windows often depict religious imagery, yet, they are also visible from the outside of the building
and may lend to the building’s historic character. An argument can be made that the funding is
acceptable if the windows are historically significant, are not used in a religious service beyond simply
allowing light into the building, and the funding is provided to a broad range of recip ients not defined
by religion. In contrast, an argument can be made that the stained glass windows that depict religious
imagery cannot be divorced from that character, and therefore, it is impermissible for the federal
government to subsidize this religious message. Because the issue of providing federal funding for this
type of religious imagery is such a close question and may be interpreted differently by different
courts, it may be prudent to avoid this issue by declining to fund such projects.
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Another suggestion may be made that the beneficiaries of federal grants from the Save
America’s Treasures program should be required to provide notice to the public of the nature of the
building’s national, historic significance. This notice would further the principle that Save America’s
Treasures grants are provided “only for the benefit of the public”281 by ensuring that the public, in fact,
is aware of the import of the building to appreciate it as such. In addition, this notice would further
ensure that the funding does not have the effect of advancing religion, because it would more clearly
demonstrate to Justice O’Connor’s “reasonable observer” that “religious indoctrination is [not being]
supported by government assistance.”282 Rather, the government assistance is solely directed to
preserving the secular elements of an important, historic, and only coincidentally religious building.
This notice could be in the form of signage, tours, or other media, and should be readily available to
those who visit dur ing the days the building must be open to the public.
It is important to note, finally, that in Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court, in no uncertain
terms, instructed that “we do not hold that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by
implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”283 The Court went on to “reaffirm that if a precedent of
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”284 Despite the apparent movement in the doctrine of
the Establishment Clause, the rule of Tilton, Hunt and Nyquist, that prohibits government aid to
construct, maintain or repair pervasively sectarian institutions, has never been repudiated or directly
questioned by a majority of the Supreme Court. If the principles underlying these cases have been
explicitly overruled, however, it is fair to assume that the Supreme Court may take the opportunity to
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dispense with this case law that is in tension with its more recent decisions in Agostini and Mitchell.
Yet, the votes of the Justices were nearly unanimous in the Tilton-Hunt-Nyquist jurisprudence. 285 In
fact, Justice O’Connor cites Tilton with apparent approval in her concurrence in Mitchell. 286 As such,
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in flux and perhaps it is not fair or wise to attempt to discern
its future.
B. Principle of Non-Discrimination in General Governmental Services
Since its first modern Establishment Clause decision in Everson v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court has indicated that religious institutions are entitled to receive “general government
services” made available on the basis of neutral criteria. 287 Everson held that the Establishment Clause
does not prevent the government from providing generally available busing services to students
attending religious schools. 288 The Court explained that even if the neutral provision of busing
services increased the likelihood that some parents would send their children to religious schools, the
same could be said with respect to other general government benefits such as “ordinary police and fire
protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways, and sidewalks.”289 The Court concluded
that “the First Amendment . . . requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more
to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.”290
This principle has been reaffirmed many times and most recently by the dissent in Mitchell:
“We do not regard the postal system as aiding religion, even though parochial schools get mail.”291 In
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Board of Education v. Allen, the Court also permitted the government to provide secular textbooks
loaned by the State on equal terms to students attending both public and church-related elementary
schools. 292 Because it had not been shown in this case that the secular textbooks would be used for
anything but secular purposes, the Court concluded that, as in Everson, the State was merely
“extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens.”293 Thus, Everson and Allen hold that sometimes
the State may act in a way that has the incidental effect of facilitating religious activity:
The Court has not been blind to the fact that in aiding a religious institution to perform
a secular task, the State frees the institution’s resources to be put to sectarian ends. If
this were impermissible, however, a church could not be protected by the police and fire
departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair. The Court never has held that
religious activities must be discriminated against in this way. 294
The Court has “consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment
Clause challenge.”295 As Justice Brennan expressed the point in Texas Monthly: “Insofar as [a]
subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in
pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not
deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment
Clause.”296 For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission,297 the Court rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to a property tax exemption made available not only to churches, but to other nonprofit
institutions, such as “hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic
groups.”298 In upholding the tax exemption, the Court relied in part upon its breadth: the exemption

292

Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Id. at 242.
294
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
295
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994) (“we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious
groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges”).
296
489 U.S. at 14-15 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). As the Court explained in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
274 (1981), “[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect.”
297
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
298
Id. at 673; see also id. at 667 n.1.
293

43

did “not single[] out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such,” but rather was
available to “a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations.”299
The opinion is correct to argue that the Save America’s Treasures program is ana logous to aid
that qualifies as “general government services” approved by the Court in Everson. Although the
historic preservation grants program is not as universal as fire fighting, for example, the broad range of
beneficiaries is extensive enough to satisfy existing Supreme Court precedent. The Save America’s
Treasures program includes a broad range of beneficiary institutions, “including not only private nonprofit groups, but state and local governmental units, Indian tribes, and numerous federal age ncies,
each of which may seek funding to preserve any and all kinds of historic structures.”300 As such, just
as the wide-ranging group of beneficiaries was sufficient to sustain the inclusion of religious
institutions for the tax benefit in Walz, the breadth of eligibility for the Save America’s Treasures
Program weighs heavily in favor of its constitutionality as well. 301 In contrast to the education-specific
aid in Nyquist, Hunt, and Tilton, the grants under this program are awarded to beneficiaries in a vast
number of fields. Thus, although the grants are not as widely distributed as mail or fire fighting
service, they are provided to many beneficiaries for one common goal, the preservation of buildings
that played an important role in our nation’s history. 302
CONCLUSION
The Save America’s Treasures program has helped protect more than 700 of the country’s
defining buildings, sites, and documents. 303 Historic religious buildings are among those places that
represent our country’s cultural heritage and stand as important links to our past as a nation. Under the
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mitchell v. Helms, the
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Supreme Court would likely uphold the grant to the Old North Church, or another religious building.304
The regulations controlling the use of grant funds by religious institutions prohibit those funds from
being used to promote religion, and may only be used to preserve historically significant features. As
such, the grant program has a secular purpose, and does not have the effect of advancing religion. In
addition, the grant program may be sustained under the principle that religious institutions may not be
discriminated against in the distribution of general governmental services provided on the basis of
neutral criteria. 305 Thus, if challenged, the Supreme Court should find that historic preservation grants
to religious institutions distributed on the basis of neutral criteria do not endorse religion. Rather, such
grants demonstrate that the government is not hostile to religion, and will not discriminate against it.
This should especially be true in the context of the preservation of buildings that played an important
role in our nation’s history and that, given their charitable status, are most in need of assistance.
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